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268 Abstract
Do governments satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint? This paper uses a 
panel of U.S. state data from 1978-1998 to empirically investigate whether pri-
mary surpluses respond to rising debt/GDP ratios. Instead of relying solely on the 
time-series characteristics of various data series, the paper focuses on the 
response of primary surpluses when cyclical fluctuations in output and govern-
ment spending are explicitly considered. Results suggest no surplus response to 
the accumulation of debt, whether or not cyclical fluctuations are controlled for, 
in contrast to similar studies done using U.S. federal government data.
Keywords: fiscal policy, fiscal sustainability, public debt, budget deficits
1 INTRODUCTION
Do governments implement sustainable fiscal policies? That is, do they pursue 
fiscal policies that will result in “manageable” deficit and debt levels rather than 
explosive debt and insolvency? This is an important question for several reasons. 
Clearly, governments lose a stabilization tool if the use of the public budget, due 
to insolvency, is no longer an option during economic downturns. Aging popula-
tions that will increase future liabilities require “appropriate” levels of debt today. 
Large debt burdens may hamper the central bank’s ability to resist the temptation 
to inflate the debt away. The debt crisis in Greece and multiple countries’ repeated 
violations of the Eurozone’s debt and deficit limits have renewed interest in the 
issue of fiscal sustainability.
Given its importance, there is surprisingly no universally agreed upon definition 
for the sustainability of fiscal policy (see Balassone and Franco (2000) for a discus-
sion of various interpretations). Most empirical papers focus on the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint: the current value of the public debt must equal the 
discounted value of future primary (non-interest) surpluses. A violation of the 
intertemporal budget constraint means that debt will grow at a rate faster than the 
growth rate of the economy. If the government were able to borrow to pay interest 
costs, it would face no constraint and would be engaging in a Ponzi scheme.
One stream in the empirical literature on debt sustainability focuses on testing 
relevant variables for stationarity or co-integration to determine if the government 
intertemporally balances its budget (see, e.g. Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Trehan 
and Walsh, 1988, 1991; Bohn, 1991; Kremers, 1989; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; and 
Quintos, 1995). However, Bohn (2007) has faulted these types of tests as invalid, 
given that the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied if either the debt or rev-
enue and with-interest spending series are integrated of arbitrarily higher order, 
i.e. if they are stationary after an arbitrary sequence of differencing.
Additionally, these types of tests have been criticized in a series of papers by Bohn 
(1995, 1998, 2008) as uninformative because in the case of uncertainty, finding an 
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269Bohn (1995) shows that bond returns are unsuitable as discount rates in transver-
sality conditions as the relevant uncertainty pertains to the level of future total 
public debt, and not the riskiness of specific debt securities. Thus studies focusing 
on unit root and cointegration tests – that is, testing whether various fiscal time 
series are consistent with the hypothesis that the expected present value of pri-
mary balances equals discounted initial debt – are incorrect as they use the wrong 
discount rate. 
Given these problematic issues with time series tests in this context, Bohn (1998) 
focuses on testing a fiscal policy reaction function. Using Barro’s (1979) tax smooth-
ing model and Barro’s (1986) and Sahasakul’s (1986) empirical work as starting 
points, Bohn (1998) shows that if the primary (noninterest) budget surplus-income 
ratio responds positively to changes in the debt-income ratio, then fiscal policy is 
sustainable. He also shows that this relationship can be obscured by war-time spend-
ing and cyclical fluctuations in output, thus providing an additional explanation as 
to why unit root tests might fail to find evidence of corrective action. Importantly, 
this method is also independent of the discount rate used. This theoretical and 
empirical strategy has been termed the “fiscal reaction function” approach or “model 
based sustainability” approach. Using U.S. federal government data, Bohn (1998) 
finds that the primary surplus-income is an increasing function of the debt-GDP 
ratio; that is, the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied for the U.S.
Several papers have used the fiscal reaction function approach of Bohn (1998) to 
test for sustainability in other countries. Greiner, Köller and Semmler (2007) 
focus on Italy (for its high debt/GDP ratio) and France, Germany, and Portugal 
(violators of the Maastricht treaty’s deficit limit of three percent of GDP) and find 
evidence for sustainability. Mendoza and Ostry (2008) use panels of advanced and 
emerging countries and also find that fiscal policy is responsible – the primary 
fiscal balance responds positively to changes in debt. 
This paper uses techniques similar to those of Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998) and 
investigates the response of U.S. states’ primary surplus-income ratios to their 
debt-income ratios, in order to shed some light on the sustainability of fiscal poli-
cies among members of a monetary union. As in Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998), 
cyclical variables are constructed and controlled for in a consideration of the sur-
plus response to debt. Also as in Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998), the paper consid-
ers how this relationship is affected if an interest rate variable is included. Find-
ings are robust and indicate that U.S. states’ primary surplus-income ratios do not 
respond to their debt-income ratios, in contrast to Bohn’s (1998) results for the 
federal government. This result also runs counter to Mendoza and Ostry (2008) 
and Greiner and Semmler (2007). However, Greiner and Semmler (2007) focuses 
on individual countries and the samples in Mendoza and Ostry (2008) mix Euro-
zone and non-Eurozone countries. It is also found that states do not respond to 
credit market pressure, in the sense that the primary budget surplus-income ratio 
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270 2 THE USE OF STATE DATA
The existence of various types of balanced budget rules and tax and expenditure 
limitations in U.S. states would seem to hinder their ability to run deficits/sur-
pluses and thus limit the application of an intertemporal, optimizing model. How-
ever, while Bohn and Inman (1996) find that states that have regulations limiting 
the amount of debt have lower average deficits, Sørensen, Wu and Yosha (1998) 
find that states are able to systematically smooth income shocks, suggesting that 
in practice states are not bound by these requirements. Kula (2014) examines the 
extent of public consumption smoothing at the state and local level. Furthermore, 
Chaney, Copley and Stone (2002) find that budget stressed states underfund their 
pensions and choose discount rates that obscure the underfunding in order to meet 
balanced budget requirements. Anecdotal evidence of budgetary “finesse” can be 
found in newspapers on a regular basis, e.g.: “N.J. Pension Fund Endangered by 
Diverted Billions” (The New York Times 4/4/07); “The Illusion of Pension Sav-
ings” (The New York Times 9/17/10). For more examples of state and local govern-
ments skirting balanced budget laws/budget regulations, see, Holtz-Eakin, Rosen 
and Tilly (1994). 
3 MODEL AND ESTIMATING EQUATIONS
This section reviews work by Barro (1979, 1986, 1989) and Sahasakul (1986) that 
is used by Bohn (1998) to develop a fiscal policy reaction function estimating 
equation.
According to Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model, an optimizing government 
smoothes the costs of distortionary taxation over time by adjusting its tax rate only 
in response to changes in permanent government spending or its debt level. Tem-
porary changes in spending or income result in budget deficits or surpluses. 
Denote the real cost of collecting taxes at time t by Zt. This cost is a time invariant, 
linearly homogeneous function of real tax revenue Tt and real aggregate output Yt. 
Denote the tax rate by τt. Thus Zt = F(Tt , Yt) = f (τt)Yt where f ' > 0, f '' > 0. 
The government chooses its sequence of tax rates to minimize this convex excess 
burden function subject to two constraints: raised tax revenue must equal exoge-
nously given government spending (Gt ), and the government cannot engage in 
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271The solution to this optimization problem is for the government to set a constant 
tax rate: . Re-writing the government’s budget constraint beginning 
at time i gives
Imposing the tax smoothing condition of τt = τi for all t > 1 on the budget constraint 
gives the tax rate at time i as
  (1)
Assume that in steady state Gt and Yt grow at rate n. Then “normal” or permanent 
(the annuity value of current and expected expenditures) spending Gi* and “nor-
mal” or permanent output (constant for t ≥ 1) sequences can be defined as those 
that satisfy
and
Then, as in Barro (1986, 1989), substituting the permanent variables into equation 
(1) leads to period i tax rate
  (2)
The period i budget surplus is given by the government’s budget constraint:
  (3)
Substituting equation (2) into equation (3) and re-arranging terms gives:
or
  (4)
where (r – n)Bi – 1 is assumed to be small relative to Gi*, Gi – Gi* is temporary spend-
ing, or GVAR; and (1 – Yi /Yi* )Gi* is cyclical output, or YVAR. Thus the surplus 
responds to increases in temporary spending and cyclical output shortfalls, as well 
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272 Bohn (1998) uses the above derivation to motivate his estimating equation (from 
equation (4)): 
  (5)
where st is the primary surplus divided by output (GNP is used as his sample begins 
in 1916); dt is the outstanding debt at the beginning of period t divided by GNP; 
GVARt is the temporary government spending to output ratio; and YVARt is a meas-
ure of the cyclical fluctuation of output. Using a sample from 1916-1995, he finds 
that the primary surplus is an increasing function of the debt-GNP ratio, meaning 
that the U.S. government systematically responds to changes in the debt-GNP ratio 
and behaves according to an intertemporal budget constraint, with this result being 
sensitive to the inclusion of temporary spending and output. When these variables 
are left out, the relationship disappears. In one criticism of statistically based stud-
ies, Bohn (1998) notes that regressions testing for a unit root in the debt/GDP ratio 
are misspecified because of the omission of the cyclical variables GVAR and YVAR 
– and therefore it is not surprising that they cannot reject the unit root.
As an extension, consider a non-constant interest rate, as discussed in Barro 
(1989). If the interest rate varies around a trend, the permanent interest rate (i.e. an 
asset paying ri*– 1 has the same present value of an asset with varying payments) is 
given by
and equation (4) becomes
 (6)
where  represents “temporary interest payments” (RVAR). Thus the 
surplus also responds to movements in interest rates around trend levels.
Equation (6) can be written as 
  (7)
Bohn (1998) also examines whether the debt-surplus relationship for the U.S. is 
invariant to the real interest rate by estimating equation (7). He finds that the 
positive relationship between debt and surplus is not affected by various real inter-
est rate measures, such as the average real return on government debt. 
This paper uses a panel of U.S. states and unique data on interest rates to examine 
fiscal sustainability. Specifications with and without the cyclical variables will be 
used to compare results to Bohn’s (1998) finding that their inclusion affects the 
impact of debt on the surplus when federal data is used. Additionally, specifica-
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273finding that its inclusion does not affect the impact of debt on the surplus. Impor-
tantly, this specification also sheds light on whether or not the surplus responds to 
the interest rate; that is, whether credit markets influence government spending 
and taxing decisions.






where Sjt is the primary (noninterest) budget surplus-income ratio for state j at 
time t, djt is the beginning of period t debt-income ratio, Rjt is the period t interest 
rate, GVARjt is cyclical government spending, and YVARjt is cyclical output. A 
positive coefficient on djt would indicate that the government takes corrective 
action. Additionally, a positive coefficient on the interest rate variable would indi-
cate that the government takes corrective action in response to higher borrowing 
costs. Note, however, the potentially endogenous relationship between the interest 
rate and the surplus. A larger primary surplus, e.g. may indicate a lower likeli-
hood of default, and thus correspond to a lower interest rate. Given the potential 
endogeneity between the surplus and the interest rate, the lagged interest rate is 
used. Additionally, to capture unobserved, time invariant state-specific attributes 
that may affect spending, state fixed effects are included in the estimation. With 
the panel data approach and the use of a state fixed effects parameter to capture 
state-specific time invariant characteristics, some inherent differences across 
states that account for differences in the interest rates are accounted for in the 
specification, and are thus less likely to be caught in the residual, allowing for the 
lagged interest rate to be an acceptable method to control for endogeneity.
The final estimation issue concerns spurious correlation. Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests on each data series were unable to reject that they were unit root pro-
cesses. However, given the length of the series and the low power of ADF tests, 
this result is not unexpected. Each series with state and time fixed effects removed 
was plotted over time to determine whether the removal of time fixed effects 
would be sufficient for stationarity. The graphs for each of the series suggest that 
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3.1 FORMATION OF THE CYCLICAL VARIABLES GVARjt AND YVARjt
As in Barro (1986), Sahasakul (1986) and Bohn (1998), the permanent and tem-
porary series must be constructed; each of these uses methods from Barro (1979) 
and they begin by decomposing government spending into defense and nonde-
fense components. The series for permanent defense spending is derived from the 
premise that actual defense spending is determined by lagged casualty rate meas-
ures and the lagged stock of military equipment. Temporary spending is actual 
spending minus permanent spending. For U.S. states, this method would not be 
appropriate.
The temporary spending variable GVARjt is found for each state for each time 
period in two steps. First, the sensitivity of government expenditure to the unem-
ployment rate and the growth rate of output and its lag is determined. The cyclical 
spending variable is then constructed by considering these sensitivity parameters 
and the deviations of the actual unemployment rate and the growth rate of output 
at time t (and its lag) from their “permanent”, or estimated weighted average lev-
els at time t.
Specifically, consider the formation of the noncyclical unemployment rate and the 
growth rate of output. To construct these series, the underlying data generating 
process for each observed series must be determined. After the removal of time 
fixed effects, graphs of the unemployment rate and the growth rate of output indi-
cate that an AR(1) process is a good descriptor for each. Focusing on the unem-
ployment rate series, the data generating process for the unemployment rate with 




Summing from s = 1 to ∞ and assuming that the real interest rate net of the growth 
rate of output is the same for all states (ρ = r – n = 0.2), gives the equation for the 
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275   (18)
Equation (16) is estimated and parameters  and  are found. They are used in 
equation (18) to obtain the complete series for the estimated weighted average 
unemployment rate. A similar procedure is used to find the series for the estimated 
weighted average of the growth rate of output.
The sensitivity of spending to the unemployment rate and the growth rate of out-
put and its lag is found by estimating: 
  (19)
where gjt is the government expenditure to output ratio.
Estimated parameters , , and  are used along with u*jt, the estimated weighted 
average unemployment rate series, and output growth rate series, , to cal-
culate GVARjt.
Temporary output YVARjt is formed in a manner similar to that of Barro (1986) and 
Bohn (1998). Barro (1986) discusses the difficulties in forming a permanent, and 
therefore temporary, output series, and shows the algebraic manipulation neces-
sary to arrive at a convenient form for temporary output: 
where 5.4% is the assumed natural unemployment rate and g* is the permanent 
government spending to output ratio. Barro (1986) also discusses why the above 
measure is preferred to various alternatives attempted.
Here, instead of making an assumption about the natural unemployment rate, the 
average unemployment rate for each state over the sample period is used (with all 
results robust to using the natural rate of 5.4%). The permanent government 
spending to output ratio, g* equals the actual expenditure series for each state, gjt, 
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276 4 DATA
The primary (noninterest) surplus-income ratio, sjt is defined as state and local 
direct general expenditure minus interest payments on general debt minus tax 
revenue divided by gross state product (GSP). The combined state and local sector 
is used to avoid problems resulting from the differing assignment of functional 
responsibilities of state and local governments across states. The debt-income 
ratio, djt , is long term debt as a percentage of GSP. Data on direct general expend-
iture, interest payments on general debt, long term debt and total revenue are from 
Government Finances, Bureau of the Census, for the years 1978-1998. GSP is 
from the Census Bureau; the unemployment rate series are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (1978-1998). The sample covers the years 1978-1998, except for 
GSP, where data from 1963-2009 are used to estimate the parameters used in con-
structing the noncyclical series.
Regressions which include the interest rate raise an issue regarding the appropri-
ate variable to use. As discussed in Bohn (2005), past statistical based studies have 
confused the uncertainty about the level of future total public debt, which is what 
is needed, with the riskiness of specific debt securities, which is what researchers 
have used. This paper uses a unique data source to solve this problem. The Chubb 
Relative Value Study was started in 1973 (ending in 1998) by the Chubb Insurance 
Company to address the lack of information available on municipal bond trading 
values, as the market for state general obligation bonds is typically very thin, 
resulting in a lack of availability of market prices for individual issues (Bayoumi, 
Goldsteina and Woglom, 1995; Park, 1997; Liu and Thakor, 1984). Additionally, 
state general obligation bond issues may vary for several reasons, including call 
provisions, maturity dates, tax issues, and insurance coverage. Semi-annually, 
twenty to twenty-five sell-side traders at major brokerage firms dealing in tax 
exempt bonds were polled as to where they thought twenty-year comparable state 
general obligation bonds should trade relative to the chosen benchmark state, New 
Jersey (chosen as at the time it was close to the midpoint of state trading values 
and was seen as being stable regarding creditworthiness). The traders considered 
similar bonds for the states, so the difference in spreads reflects only differences 
in default risk, thus solving the problems of comparing state general obligation 
bond issues and isolating a default risk premium for each state. Importantly for the 
current paper, the default risk would clearly be tied to expectations of the future 
path of total public debt (and specifically not tied to the riskiness of a particular 
security), so using this measure avoids Bohn’s (2005) criticism of empirical work 
using the wrong interest rate when testing sustainability. Because the Chubb data 
spans the period 1973-1998 and long term debt is available beginning in 1978, the 
sample data used runs from 1978 to 1998. 
Given the uniqueness of the Chubb data in allowing for the comparison of state 
bond yields, they have been used in several papers including Goldstein and Wog-
lom (1992) and Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995) in their investigation of 
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277(1999, 2001) which focus on the relationship between fiscal institutions and bond 
yields; and Andersen et al. (2014), which examines how the quality of fiscal gov-
ernance, proxied for by the government’s ability to submit an on-time budget, 
affects state borrowing costs.
The survey excluded states that had no outstanding debt when the survey began 
(Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming). Here, Puerto Rico (not a state), Alaska (unique in its rela-
tive oil and mineral endowments), and Hawaii (unique in its constitutional struc-
ture) are also excluded from the panel, leaving a full sample of thirty-eight states. 
The average Chubb yield for each state over the sample period 1973-1998 and 
other descriptive statistics are given in table 1. 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics 
Chubb yld surp lus de bt GV AR YV AR
State mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
Alabama 11.270 6.147 -0.009 0.006 0.133 0.015 0.016 0.041 0.007 0.251
California 9.266 12.167 -0.011 0.003 0.112 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.064 0.193
Connecticut 9.087 14.542 -0.015 0.008 0.144 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.083 0.145
Delaware 20.241 19.968 -0.022 0.006 0.202 0.031 0.089 0.125 0.045 0.307
Florida 15.537 10.295 -0.011 0.004 0.164 0.041 0.003 0.008 0.085 0.159
Georgia -6.963 3.761 -0.011 0.004 0.114 0.009 0.004 0.021 0.060 0.124
Illinois 17.118 6.785 -0.013 0.002 0.116 0.018 0.001 0.009 0.043 0.221
Kentucky 4.005 6.457 -0.016 0.007 0.204 0.013 0.004 0.033 0.028 0.221
Louisiana 33.487 31.183 -0.015 0.006 0.173 0.051 -0.002 0.035 0.045 0.294
Maine 11.926 5.288 -0.017 0.006 0.146 0.018 0.049 0.093 0.092 0.203
Maryland -3.440 3.336 -0.017 0.005 0.160 0.012 0.007 0.020 0.099 0.170
Massachusetts 43.978 32.523 -0.016 0.005 0.156 0.024 0.006 0.012 0.090 0.207
Michigan 35.550 39.887 -0.011 0.004 0.111 0.011 0.009 0.018 0.141 0.449
Minnesota 5.480 10.195 -0.015 0.006 0.171 0.021 0.003 0.018 0.068 0.206
Mississippi 10.663 5.793 -0.011 0.005 0.112 0.016 -0.002 0.066 -0.032 0.312
Missouri -10.334 5.634 -0.011 0.003 0.090 0.011 0.005 0.023 0.040 0.170
Montana 3.685 8.986 -0.020 0.007 0.155 0.037 -0.057 0.145 0.058 0.270
Nevada 19.581 7.953 -0.005 0.006 0.145 0.026 0.017 0.051 0.031 0.210
New Hampshire 12.881 13.337 -0.011 0.005 0.169 0.035 0.023 0.093 0.057 0.201
New Jersey 0.000 0.000 -0.015 0.005 0.142 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.096 0.172
New Mexico 10.232 6.620 -0.024 0.012 0.157 0.039 0.011 0.095 0.063 0.186
New York 30.336 21.598 -0.019 0.006 0.198 0.022 0.002 0.004 0.113 0.192
North Carolina -12.746 5.031 -0.008 0.004 0.097 0.019 0.004 0.022 0.045 0.180
North Dakota 7.635 13.844 -0.016 0.006 0.137 0.061 -0.080 0.385 0.076 0.389
Ohio 9.900 16.103 -0.009 0.004 0.090  0.010 0.003  0.010 0.050 0.270
Oklahoma -1.630 16.920 -0.014 0.004 0.126 0.029 -0.015 0.037 0.028 0.219
Oregon 23.775 25.132 -0.018 0.005 0.198  0.050 0.001 0.033 0.093 0.342
Pennsylvania 34.453 31.244 -0.017 0.005 0.161 0.018 0.004 0.008 0.082 0.225
Rhode Island 20.035 6.831 -0.015 0.008 0.212 0.027 0.050 0.073 0.057 0.203
South Carolina -9.187 4.414 -0.009 0.006 0.146 0.016 0.007 0.039 0.021 0.211
Tennessee -6.952 4.595 -0.008 0.004 0.120 0.015 0.008 0.029 0.031 0.196
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278 Chubb yld surp lus de bt GV AR YV AR
State mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
Utah -6.147 9.823 -0.012 0.007 0.248 0.091 0.014 0.062 0.001 0.157
Vermont 14.988 8.250 -0.017 0.005 0.154 0.010 0.082 0.166 0.036 0.244
Virginia -10.169 9.393 -0.008 0.003 0.105 0.015 0.003 0.016 0.066 0.130
Washington 32.765 29.820 -0.007 0.008 0.224 0.023 0.008 0.014 0.068 0.219
West Virginia 23.134 8.691 -0.016 0.005 0.188 0.023 -0.005 0.090 -0.143 0.376
Wisconsin 10.883 9.737 -0.010 0.004 0.117 0.015 0.005 0.016 0.053 0.286
Notes: all data 1978-1998. Average Chubb yield in basis points. Surplus and debt are shares of 
gross state product; GVAR and YVAR defined in section 4.
The average Chubb yield for each year for the sample period and the high-low 
spread are given in table 2. The recession years of 1976, 1982, and 1983 show the 
largest spreads while the smallest occur in 1998, a period of low inflation and 
unemployment and high growth for the U.S.
Table 2
Average Chubb yields over all states and high-low spread by year 
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2795 RESULTS
Consider equations (12) and (13). If governments satisfy an intertemporal budget 
constraint in that they take corrective action in response to an increasing debt-
income ratio, β1 is expected to be positive in equation (12). If this relationship is 
obscured by cyclical spending and output, we should find β1 to be positive in equa-
tion (13). The coefficients on cyclical spending and output should be negative. The 
same holds true for equations (14) and (15), which add the interest rate to the regres-
sions; here, it should also be found that β2 is positive in equations (14) and (15). 
First consider the results when the interest rate variable is not included. Table 3 
contains results for pooled data; table 4 contains results when only state fixed 
effects are included; and table 5 contains results when both state and time fixed 
effects are included. The (a) section of each table does not include the cyclical 
variables; the (b) section does. Whether or not cyclical variables are included, the 
coefficient on the debt-income ratio is negative, contrary to theory, and statisti-
cally significant for all specifications (pooled, state fixed effects only included; 
state and time fixed effects included). The coefficients on cyclical spending and 
output are either statistically insignificant or are statistically significant and posi-
tive, contrary to what is predicted, except for the pooled regression, where the 
cyclical spending coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the ten per-
cent level. 
Table 3a 




Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 3b 
sjt = α + β1 djt + β2 GVARjt + β3 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.04 -0.005 -0.000
Standard error 0.005 0.003 0.001
t-stat -9.13*** -1.91* 0.15
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
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280 Table 4a




Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 4b
sjt = αj + β1 djt + β2 GVARjt + β3 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.03 -0.002 0.002
Standard error 0.008 0.002 0.001
t-stat -3.63*** 1.05 1.15
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 5a




Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 5b
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 GVARjt + β3 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.04 0.004 0.004
Standard error 0.008 0.02 0.001
t-stat -5.25*** -1.94* 2.85***
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
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281Tables 6-8 contain results for all of the above regressions, this time with the inter-
est rate variable included. Table 6 contains results for pooled data; table 7 contains 
results when only state fixed effects are included; and table 8 contains results 
when both state and time fixed effects are included. The (a) section of each table 
does not include the cyclical variables; the (b) section does. As in all regressions 
which did not include the interest rate variable, whether or not cyclical variables 
are included, the coefficient on the debt-income ratio is negative and statistically 
significant for all specifications (pooled, state fixed effects only included; state 
and time fixed effects included). The coefficients on cyclical spending and output 
are either statistically insignificant or are statistically significant and positive, con-
trary to what is predicted, except for the pooled regression, where the cyclical 
output coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Additionally, the coefficient on the interest rate risk premium is also negative and 
statistically significant whether or not cyclical variables are included, and for all 
specifications (pooled, state fixed effects only included; state and time fixed 
effects included). This suggests there is no response by governments in their 
spending and taxing behavior to credit market signals. The positive coefficient on 
the output gap when state and time fixed effects are included can be interpreted as 
states running a countercyclical fiscal policy or may reflect the greater responsive-
ness of tax revenues to downturns than government spending at the state level. 
Table 6a 
sjt = α + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + εjt
Estimate -0.03 -0.58
Standard error 0.01 0.16
t-stat -3.55*** -3.58***
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 6b
sjt = α + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + β3 GVARjt + β4 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.04 -0.42 -0.001  -0.004
Standard error 0.01 0.12 0.001 0.003
t-stat -7.46*** -3.53*** 1.01  -1.68*
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.









































43 (3) 267-289 (2019)
282 Table 7a
sjt = αj + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + εjt
Estimate -0.02 -0.59
Standard error 0.01 0.16
t-stat -2.82*** -3.68***
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 7b
sjt = αj + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + β3 GVARjt + β4 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.02 -0.67 0.002 0.003
Standard error 0.01 0.16 0.001 0.002
t-stat -2.69*** -4.07*** 2.09** 1.36
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 8a
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + εjt
Estimate -0.03 -0.32
Standard error 0.01 0.15
t-stat -3.98*** -2.11**
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 8b
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + β3 GVARjt + β4 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.04 -0.42 0.004 0.004 
Standard error 0.01 0.15 0.001 0.002
t-stat -4.44*** -2.75*** 3.38***  2.09** 
Notes: autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
See table 1 for states; 1978-1998.
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283As a further check, adding the lagged surplus-income ratio as an independent 
variable to equation (15) and using Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM 
estimation supports the conclusion on the surplus-debt relationship reached above: 
the coefficient on the debt-income ratio is negative and statistically significant, 
while that for the interest rate is statistically insignificant from zero (one step esti-
mates with robust test statistics) for various lag lengths used for instruments.
Finally, the sample is split into two groups based on a ranking by debt/GSP. The 
high debt states are those with debt at or above the mean of 14% of GSP (25 
states); the low debt states have debt below 14% of GSP (13 states). Results are in 
table 9 (high debt) and 10 (low debt). (Results in tables 9 and 10 are robust to 
moving the four states with 14% debt levels into the low debt group.) For the high 
debt subsample, all results match the full sample when the cyclical variables are 
included; when the cyclical variables are not included, the coefficient on the debt-
income ratio is negative and statistically significant while the interest rate coeffi-
cient is not significant. All results for the low debt subsample are not statistically 
significant different than zero. The overall conclusion remains the same as that 
with the full sample: the surplus-income ratio does not respond to the debt-income 
ratio in the way predicted by fiscal sustainability; nor does it respond to credit 
market signals. 
Table 9a
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + εjt
Estimate -0.04 -0.34
Standard error 0.01 0.22
t-stat -3.68*** -1.58
Notes: high debt/GSP subsample: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia; 1978-1998.
Autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates. 
** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 9b
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + β3 GVARjt + β4 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.05 -0.45 0.011 0.006 
Standard error 0.01 0.22 0.005 0.002
t-stat -4.14*** -2.09** 2.21***  2.99*** 
Notes: high debt/GSP subsample: see table 9a for states.
Autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates; 1978-1998.
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284 Table 10a
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + εjt
Estimate -0.009 -0.229
Standard error 0.011 0.195
t-stat -0.859   -1.18
Notes: low debt/GSP subsample: Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin. 
Autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates; 1978-1998.
Table 10b
sjt = αj + γt + β1 djt + β2 Rjt –1 + β3 GVARjt + β4 YVARjt + εjt
Estimate -0.013 -0.32 0.001 0.002 
Standard error 0.011 0.20 0.002 0.002
t-stat   -1.2    -1.57    0.58    1.46 
Notes: low debt/GSP subsample: see table 10a for states.
Autocorrelation corrected maximum likelihood estimates: 1978-1998.
All of the results serve as a strong repudiation of any type of optimizing behavior 
on the part of U.S. states over the time period studied. They do not take corrective 
actions in response to the accumulation of debt and thus do not satisfy an intertem-
poral budget constraint. This result contrasts with those of Bohn (1998), which 
finds that the U.S. federal government satisfies an intertemporal budget constraint, 
and Mendoza and Ostry (2008), which uses panels of advanced and emerging 
countries and finds that fiscal policy is responsible. 
Why do results for the states differ from those for the U.S. federal government 
found in Bohn (1998)? One explanation is that the states believe that they will be 
helped either by other branches of state government, like the judicial branch, or by 
the federal government – where federal help need not be in the form of an explicit 
bailout. For example, during the time period of this study, states implemented 
various strategies to garner payments from the federal government via its program 
for assisting state hospitals that served a “disproportionate share” of uninsured 
people and those receiving Medicaid, a health insurance program for those with 
low incomes which had low reimbursement rates. In a study of disproportionate 
share payments, Ku and Coughlin (1995) concluded that the programs were usu-
ally created to generate extra revenue for the overall state budget: “How did the 
States use the additional $4.9 billion gained through these mechanisms? … the 
common reply was that ‘money is fungible’. The additional funds generally 
flowed into State general fund coffers, were mixed with other state funds…”.
Also during this time period, states were pursuing legal action against tobacco 
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285ment in 1998 with 46 states that had sued to recover health care costs related to 
treating smokers. In return for giving up future legal claims, the states received 
payments in perpetuity as compensation for smoking-related taxpayer-paid health 
care. The MSA did not require states to use their ongoing settlement payments for 
tobacco control programs. In 2007 the GAO (Shames, 2007) found that from 
2000-2005, while 30% of the payments went to health care, the next highest total, 
22.9%, went to cover budget shortfalls (and the lowest share, 3.5%, went to 
tobacco-control programs).
An out-of-sample example that again illustrates the possibility of states’ abilities 
to access one-off funding occurred in 2011, when Google settled a Department of 
Justice suit by forfeiting $500 million for allowing Canadian pharmacies to ille-
gally sell prescription drugs to U.S. consumers through Google’s AdWords pro-
gram. The forfeited money was split between federal agencies, e.g. the FDA and 
IRS, and Rhode Island state and local law enforcement agencies (about $230 mil-
lion) that helped in the investigation. How exactly did Rhode Island use its portion 
of the forfeiture?
“The settlement by Google, which was announced a year ago, has been used in 
part to relieve the underfunded pensions for retired policemen in two small Rhode 
Island cities, East Providence and North Providence. This unique deployment of 
$70 million (or 15% of the $500 million forfeiture) was made possible through the 
intervention of Rhode Island Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who prevailed upon 
Attorney General Eric Holder to bypass restrictions on the rules for the use of such 
criminal proceeds. Sen. Whitehouse called this settlement “a transformational 
financial moment” in that the proceeds ordinarily could be used only for law 
enforcement investigations, training and equipment. Attorney General Holder 
acquiesced in allowing the money to be used to relieve some of the underfunded 
pension plans for retired policemen in Rhode Island (Lenzner, 2014). 
The examples discussed above suggest one reason for a finding of unsustainable 
fiscal behavior by states: they have some ability to engage strategically with the 
federal government with respect to obtaining funds. States may also be able to rely 
on one-off events not available at the federal/sovereign level where judicial settle-
ments, for example, would be too small to have any significant budgetary impacts.
6 CONCLUSION
Using the empirical framework of Bohn (1998) and Barro (1986), which build on 
Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model, this paper investigates the response of U.S. 
states’ primary surplus-income ratios to their debt-income ratios as a test of the sus-
tainability of state fiscal policy. In contrast to the findings of Bohn (1998) that the 
U.S. federal government responds to increases in its debt-income ratios by increas-
ing its primary surplus, results for a sample of U.S. states during the period 1978-
1998 indicate no response to a rising debt-income ratio: that is, they were not fis-
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286 not respond to credit market pressure, in the sense that the primary budget surplus-
income ratio did not increase in response to an increasing risk premium. 
Disclosure statement 
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